Most complex systems, including engineering systems such as cars, airplanes, and satellites, are the results of the interactions of many distinct entities working on different parts of the design. Decentralized systems constitute a special class of design under distributed environments. They are characterized as large and complex systems divided into several smaller entities that have autonomy in local optimization and decision-making. A primary issue in decentralized design processes is to ensure that the designers that are involved in the process converge to a single design solution that is optimal and meets the design requirements, while being acceptable to all the participants. This is made difficult by the strong interdependencies between the designers, which are usually characteristic of such systems. This paper proposes a critical review of standard techniques to modeling and solving decentralized design problems, and shows mathematically the challenges created by having multiobjective subsystems. A method based on set-based design is then proposed to alleviate some of these challenging issues. An illustration of its applicability is given in the form of the design of a space satellite.
DECENTRALIZED DESIGN: THE PROBLEM
The focus of this paper is a theoretical study of the design of complex engineering systems, or those systems that necessitate the decomposition of the system into smaller subsystems in order to reduce the complexity of the design problems. Most of these systems are very large and multidisciplinary in nature, and therefore have a great number of subsystems and components. This creates issues in understanding the interactions between all these subsystems, in order to create more efficient design processes. In this paper, we focus on the dynamics of distributed design processes and attempt to understand the fundamental mechanics behind these processes in order to facilitate the decision process between networks of decision makers. In this section, we analyze why America, one in Europe, and one in Asia, working on the same product and communicating the information to the next team at the end of their 8-hour shift, for example. But a bigger, and more important, advantage is the notion of "risk-share partners", or partners that share the development costs of a product in order to minimize the risks of this investment. Indeed, when a company outsources the design of parts of its products to suppliers, it does not only buy the parts from the suppliers. Often times, the suppliers are asked to become partners in the product venture, where they develop components at their own expense, but share the benefits if the final product is successful. This happens very often in the aerospace industry, where the costs of designing and developing a new product are so large that a single company can usually not invest all the money without risk-share partners. In the civil aircraft segment, for example, Boeing -though the world largest aerospace firm -outsources the design of a great number of components to its risk-share partners. It is said, for example, that the Japanese companies will design and build more than 35% of the structure of the new Boeing 787 -including the wings and fuselage parts; foreign content might even run as high as 70 percent [9] . The development costs of those parts is of course paid by the Japanese companies (which will, in return, receive benefits if the 787 is a commercial success), thus cutting the development costs for Boeing.
While the decomposition of complex problems certainly creates a series of smaller, less complex problems, it also creates several challenging issues associated with the coordination of these less complex problems. The origin of these problems is the fact that the less complex subproblems are usually coupled. Systems are said to be coupled if their solution is dependent upon information from other subproblems. The ideal case would be a system that could be broken up into subsystems without interdependence. Unfortunately, design variables and parameters usually have an influence on several subproblems. Design variables and parameters that are controlled within a subsystem are called local, while non-local information is controlled by another subsystem [10] .
In order to solve these problems, previous work has been done on the decomposition of the system into smaller ones using Design Structure Matrices [11] , a hierarchical approach [12] , or by effectively propagating the desirable top level design specifications to appropriate subsystems [13, 14] . The efficiency of these approaches is compared in [15] . For more complex problems however, the decomposition is natural, as it follows the areas of competencies and/or the physical characteristics of the product to be designed. A good example is the European civil aircraft manufacturer Airbus -the world's largest civil aircraft manufacturer, which designs and builds its airplanes all across Europe. The first decomposition is made following the main sections of the airplane, and assigned depending on the area of expertise of its subdivisions: the design and manufacturing of the wings, for example, is traditionally assigned to Airbus UK. However, even a subsystem such as a wing needs to be further decomposed into smaller subsystems as it is multidisciplinary. The decomposition is then made along "Centres of Excellence" and "Centres of Competence", reflecting the multidisciplinarity of the system to be designed. Decomposition techniques can then be used to determine the allocation of design variables and of resources to these centers, which are further responsible for the interaction with the external suppliers [16] .
The decentralization of decisions seems to be the common trend in several industries in order to deal with the complexity and financing of the products. However, having several distributed design teams creates coordination issues. One reason for this is the fact that the individual teams have a limited vision of the overall product and process because of poor management and communication (in the case of subsidiary of a same company) or because of communication obstacles such as technology privacy (in the case of external suppliers). As a result, the individual design teams tend to privilege the optimality of their own subsystem, rather than the optimality of the overall product.
This has been noted in the design of engineering products [17] but this phenomenon is not inherent to engineering design. This is the classic "Tragedy of the Commons" problem from human economics [18] . Although prudent cooperation among design teams would increase overall optimality of the product, maximization of individual subsystems is standard. Cooperation increases collective success but usually at the cost of individual success. Penalization of individual optimality, as seen in some biological systems [19] , can prevent defection from cooperative duties but such coercive measures must not infringe on creative process.
Architecture is also a field where different entities have to work together to design a complex product: a building. The inefficiencies of building processes have been studied by Phillip Bernstein, an architect and professor at Yale University, and these inefficiencies are in part because the construction industry is so fragmented, he says. "Designers, architects, engineers, developers and builders each make decision that serve their own interests, but create huge inefficiencies overall" [20] . Therefore, the coordination of distributed design teams seems to be important to improve the design process of several industries, and could also avoid potential design failures.
This section showed that the decentralization of the design is paramount for companies producing complex systems. It also highlighted the issues in managing and understanding the complex interactions involved in the design of complex systems. The next section presents a background to understand better the challenges faced in engineering design.
DECENTRALIZED DESIGN: THE BACKGROUND
In order to improve design processes and avoid design failures, this section tries to formally describe the dynamics and interactions involved in such design scenarios. We believe that explaining and understanding the dynamics involved will help us make better decisions in design. This section presents the background for this work, in terms of problem formulation for decentralized decision processes, and shows the mathematical formalism used to model decentralized design process.
A common approach to solving those design problems with interacting subsystems is to use Game Theory. Game Theory provides a mathematical framework that models the interaction between decision-makers, also called players [21] . It has been mainly used in the fields of economics and social sciences before finding other applications in other areas of interest, from the stock exchange to engineering design. The main goal of using Game Theory in engineering design is to try to improve the quality of the final solution in a multiobjective, distributed design optimization problem [22] . Previous work in Game Theory includes work to model the interactions between the designers if several design variables are shared among designers [23] . In [24] , Game Theory is formally presented as a method to help designers make strategic decisions in a scientific way. In [25] , distributed collaborative design is viewed as a non-cooperative game, and maintenance considerations are introduced into a design problem using concepts from Game Theory. In [26] , the manufacturability of multi-agent process planning systems is studied using Game Theory concepts. In [27] , non-cooperative protocols are studied and the application of Stackelberg leader/follower solutions is shown. Also in [28] , a Game Theory approach is used to address and describe a multifunctional team approach for concurrent parametric design. This set of previous work has established a solid foundation for the application of game theory in design, but has failed to address concepts such as the convergence of the design process and the multiobjective nature of the subproblems, which is the focus of this paper.
Game Theory is a set of mathematical tools that can be used to represent and study complex decisions being made by multiple decision makers. We present here the primary protocols that are used to study decentralized design [29] . Table  1 shows the general problem formulation for an optimization design problem involving several design teams (in this case two designers, also called players).
Player 1's Model Player 2's Model
Minimize Minimize We denote x 1c and x 2c the non-local design variables, variables that appear in a model but are controlled by the other player. In some decomposed problems, one variable may be local to many subsystems. This kind of problem is not investigated in this paper, but is part of on-going research. We present briefly here the three main types of design scenarios; detailed mathematical formulations can be found in [30] .
Cooperative protocol:
In this protocol, both players have knowledge of the other player's information and they work together to find a Pareto solution [31] . Systems thinking is the key to full cooperation in modern organizations where a shared vision is common and subscribed to by all members of an organization [32] . However, shared vision does not suggest that the designers will necessarily fully cooperate. Mathematical and model cooperation are required to assume full cooperation and that the final design will be Pareto optimal. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case in distributed environments, as there are several obstacles to this full cooperation.
Noncooperative protocol:
This protocol occurs when full cooperation among players is not possible due to organizational, information, or process barriers. Players must make decisions by assuming the choices of the other decision makers. In an iterative approach, the final solution would be a Nash equilibrium. This solution has the property of being individually stable, but is not necessarily collectively optimal, meaning that, at this point, each designer will perceive the design point to be optimal [33] , whereas the solution is not necessarily Pareto optimal. This is because any unilateral decision to change a design variable value by either designer can not, by definition, result in a better objective function value for the designer who makes the change.
The Nash Equilibrium also has the property of being the intersection of subsets of the design space, namely the Rational Reaction Sets (RRS) of the designers. The RRS of a designer is a function that embodies his reactions to decisions made by other players [34] .
Leader/follower protocol:
This protocol, also known as Stackelberg protocol [35] , occurs in the case of a sequential process, when one design team makes their decision or finalizes their design and passes this information onto the next team. The "leader" must therefore assume something about the "followers" before making their decision. The final solution of this protocol is known as the Stackelberg solution and is generally different from the Nash solution [36] .
We believe that communication between design teams interacting in a distributed environment is never perfect. Different languages, geographical distance, difficulty in sharing models, and competition are among the factors that make full cooperation impossible. Recent studies, applied to design reviews [37] or to money games [38] have even showed that full cooperation is not necessarily desirable. Therefore the cooperative scenario can not be used to model the interactions of designers in a decentralized environment. It is typically only used as a test bed to compare the final solutions, since it leads to Pareto optimal solutions. A more realistic approach is to consider that designers are in a situation of limited cooperation, meaning that they are eager to cooperate, but only to a certain extent (the limit is defined by the existing communication barriers or the willingness to cooperate). Thus, the noncooperative scenario is used to model the relationships between designers in order to reflect the imperfect information and cooperation that exist, even within the same corporation. In other words, we focus on decentralized design scenarios where full and efficient exchange of all information among subsystems is not possible.
This serves as the mathematical background to model and solve issues related to design in distributed environments. In the next section, we discuss how decentralized problems with multiobjective subproblems can be solved.
DECENTRALIZED DESIGN: THE ISSUE OF MULTIOBJECTIVE SUBPROBLEMS
In this section, we present the main contribution of the paper, which is the analysis of decentralized design problems with multiobjective subproblems. We first analyze the standard techniques for solving decentralized problems and mathematically show their shortcomings for dealing with multiobjective subproblems. Then, we propose new techniques for approaching this kind of problems.
Rational Reaction Sets
In studying decentralized design in a non-cooperative environment, a traditional approach is to pass information back and forth between the design teams until they reach an agreement on a particular design point [22] . This iterative approach is not necessarily the ideal process to design a product, but is, in fact, widely used. It is even recommended in the development of certain products, such as the development of software products [3] . The fact that the designers eventually agree on a final design is referred to as the convergence of the design process [17] . The issue of divergence in an engineering design process was noted in [22] and has been theoretically studied in recent research [30, 39] . What happens in divergent cases is that the iterative process taken by the designers never converges and the designers do not reach consensus [40] .
One of the assumptions of the iterative approach is the nature of the exchanged information. In order to respect the assumption of limited cooperation, standard techniques usually assume that only design variable values are exchanged between the designers. Furthermore, only the design variable values corresponding to a unique design point are usually exchanged. When a design point is not satisfactory, designers move to another design point [41] . This is known as "point-to-point" design, and the Rational Reaction Sets of the designers play an important role in the convergence and final solution of the iterative process. Applications of Rational Reaction Sets in engineering design have been extensively studied in [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . 
Figure 1. A divergent decentralized design example
The importance of the Rational Reaction Sets on the dynamics of the design process is best shown by a simple example. Figure 1 shows a simple decentralized example involving two designers, each controlling one design variable [22] . Starting with the initial design (x = 0, y = 0.8), it shows the iteration of the designers between their own Rational Reaction Sets. What results is a process where the designers "spiral" outward, increasing their design variable values as the design process advances.
This example clearly shows how designers oscillate back and forth between their Rational Reaction Sets. This has been verified in the design of a pressure vessel [27] , of a passenger aircraft [29] , and in numerous other case studies. This has also been explained with mathematical formalism in [17, 30, 39] . As seen in Table 1 , every designer has their own objective function, which is generally a multimodal function that has to be minimized. Therefore, at each iteration, designer i is minimizing their objective function. Since they only control the vector of design variables x i , the rationale of designer i is to minimize F i with respect to x i , which can be written mathematically as follows:
Therefore, designer i is minimizing their objective function with respect to x i while keeping all the other design variables constant, where N is the number of design teams involved in the process. In case of single-objective subproblems, the solution to this equation is generally a single point; conditions have been found to predict the uniqueness of the solution [36] . Solving Equation (1) thus gives the formulation of the Rational Reaction Set [17] and explains why, as shown in Figure 1 , the designer oscillate between the RRS. Under these conditions, if the Rational Reaction Sets intersect, they ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Convergence or divergence of the design process under these assumptions has been proven using state-space representation [30] and nonlinear control theory [39] .
However, the notion of Rational Reaction Sets is valid only in the case of single-objective subproblems which provide a unique optimum at each iteration. On the other hand, decentralization is usually applied to complex optimization problems, which are multidisciplinary and multiobjective in nature. In this context, decomposition is often used to break up the problem into smaller subproblems [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Therefore, an assumption that is commonly made is that each subproblem has a unique objective [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Under these assumptions, Rational Reaction Sets can be used to predict the final solution and the dynamics of the design process, as described earlier. We focus on the case when a subproblem has multiple objectives.
As shown in Table 1 , the objective function F i can be a vector of objective function, and should therefore be re-written as a vector of scalar objective functions:
In industry, subsystems are often multiobjective, and it would therefore be limiting to assume that every subsystem is single-objective in nature. This is case in the design of a satellite that we present in the next section. Multiobjective optimization presents a set of different challenges than singleobjective optimization. A primary challenge is that in multiobjective problems, it is no longer possible to talk about an optimal point, but rather about an optimal set of solutions known as the Pareto set. Since Rational Reaction Sets dictate a unique optimum at each iteration, it does not make sense to talk about RRS's in the same context in multiobjective subproblems. In the absence of RRS's, studying the dynamics of decentralized decision processes is an open research issue that we propose to address here.
In solving this new kind of problem, two things have to be provided: 1) an approach for designers to choose the optimal point(s) to be passed to the next iteration and 2) a decisionmaking model that allows for the study of the dynamics and outcome of the process. We first study the different alternatives that the designers have in order to make decisions at each iteration.
Handling Multiobjective Subsystems
One straightforward approach to handling a multiobjective subproblem and determining the best response for a subproblem is to convert the multiobjective optimization problem into a single objective problem using a weighted sum approach. This would certainly result in a single unique solution at each iteration. However, this approach would assume that the objective weights are accurate and do not change from iteration to iteration. If they changed, so would the rational reaction set and studying the dynamics would not be possible. It is more usually the case that the importances of objectives shift as new information is gained and depending upon the current level of objective satisfaction. The shifting of weights throughout an optimization process is capitalized upon in Physical Programming, an effective approach to multiobjective optimization [42] . Furthermore, using a weighted sum to aggregate objectives is not an effective means to identifying the appropriate multiobjective solution in many problems [43, 44] . Therefore, it is recommended to handle the multiple objectives in a direct way.
Another approach would be to develop a representation of the Pareto frontier of each designer at each iteration and then communicate the representation to the other designers. Metamodeling techniques have been used in previous work to represent Pareto frontiers [45, 46] . If a designer preferred a certain subset of solutions from the Pareto frontier, then some kind of reduced interval could be communicated. This problem while conceptually attractive would be limited to computationally inexpensive problems, since populating and communicating Pareto frontiers at each iteration would be computationally intensive. In addition, in a distributed design environment, we feel that the assumption of communicating only design variable values is critical to maintain, which would be difficult when working with Pareto frontiers.
A Set-Based Approach to Multiobjective Subsystems
A third approach, and the approach we apply in this paper, is adapted from set-based design, which was inspired by Toyota. Already the world's most profitable car company, Toyota is now eyeing to snatch the global car market leadership from General Motors [47] . It has built its success not only on its now famous Toyota Production System [48] , but also on its engineering development processes [49] . In 'set-based concurrent engineering', designers think about sets of design alternatives, rather than pursuing one alternative iteratively, gradually narrowing this set to a single design. This idea has conceptually been applied to design by using and operating on intervals of design variables (e.g., in leader/follower design environments [50] . However this approach utilizes Rational Reaction Sets in single objective subproblems. Avoiding the use of Rational Reaction Sets has been traditionally balanced by the addition of a "designer manager" [51] .
In this paper, instead of using intervals, we propose to use a set of distinct design points. In order to ensure optimality (in a multiobjective sense), these points need to be Pareto optimal. We describe here how designers would go about communicating this set of points in a decentralized environment.
The design process starts with an initial guess of the design variable values for each design team. Given these initial guesses, the design teams perform an optimization of their subproblem with respect to the design variables they are controlling. If the subsystem is multiobjective, an algorithm to populate the Pareto set has to be used. In this paper, we use a multiobjective genetic algorithm (MOGA), as they have shown excellent performance in generating the Pareto set in a single optimization run [52] . For the satellite problem, we used a population size of 100, and 100 generations was sufficient to generate a dense representation of the Pareto set. Designers then choose a set of points from the generated set that will be communicated to the other design teams for the next iteration. This part of the process is very problem dependent as the number of points chosen by the designer depends on the complexity and the number of objectives in the optimization problem. This is discussed more in the case study. Which points of the Pareto set are chosen is also a decision that has to be made by the designer. Once the points are chosen, the design teams exchange this information. Designers then choose the design point from among the points offered by the other designers that provides them the best local objective function value, and uses it as new starting point for their local optimization problem. The process continues until global convergence.
This method presents the advantage of exploring a larger part of the Pareto set than the point-based optimization, thus increasing the probability of finding a more optimal solution, while respecting the assumption of limited cooperation by only exchanging design variable values. It is also the first application of a multiobjective Rational Reaction Set. Finally, set-based design offers several advantages over point-based design, including improved convergence properties [53] .
In this section, we analyzed the challenges created by the multiobjective nature of decentralized subproblems, and presented a basic approach that adheres to the basic assumption of limited communication and sharing of information. In the next section, we apply the approach on a complex case study and compare the results to some benchmark solutions of the study.
DECENTRALIZED DESIGN OF A SPACE SATELLITE
Space satellite development is an exceptionally demanding process that differs from that for general products. The main difference is that most space satellites are unique products, not mass-produced, and optimal performance is therefore an important requirement. The design of a satellite is therefore an interesting and valuable example to demonstrate the optimality of the process presented in this paper.
A class of piggyback satellites called "Micro-LabSat" is adopted as an example of small satellite design problems [54] . Micro-LabSat satellites are a series of engineering test satellites for the training of young engineering designers, whose overall aim is to develop new technologies concerning small satellite buses, and satellite design environments [55] . The MicroLabSat satellites are small piggyback satellites carried aloft in the remaining space of a launch vehicle when other larger satellites are placed on Earth orbit. Figure 2 shows a Micro-LabSat composed of four main parts made from laminated sheet material, namely an upper deck (UD), a lower deck (LD), three component panels (CPs), and eight side panels (SPs). On the UD, the LD and the CPs, twenty components (e.g. power unit, attitude control systems, observation units) are installed for utilization during the observation operations in space.
Figure 2. Micro-LabSat
In the initial design stage of a Micro-LabSat, the structural design optimization problem (to decide the thickness of the laminated material sheets), and the component arrangement design problem (to find the optimal arrangement of various components), are both critical and significantly interrelated. We now present these two sublevel optimization problems.
Structural Design Optimization Problem
The principal goal of the structural design of the MicroLabSat satellite is to minimize the weight, W, of the structure, while satisfying some constraints concerning the natural frequency and the maximum stress. The satellite must endure various loads during launch and observation operation time. Random vibrational loads during launch and ascent are particularly critical and potentially damaging. Therefore a finite element model is constructed, as shown in Figure 3 , and a static analysis applying the body force Mg, shown in Equation (3) is carried out.
where g stands for gravitational acceleration (9.8 m/s 2 ).
Figure 3. Finite-element model of the Micro-LabSat
Additionally, the maximum von Mises stress σ max must be lower than the allowable stress σ a of the material. Equation (4) represents this constraint mathematically, with α as a safety
Finally, the natural frequency must be in a specific range to avoid resonance effects and to dissipate the vibrational load coming from the main rocket body during launch. This is shown in Equation (5).
The design variables for this optimization subproblem are the thickness of the laminated material sheets, which are composed of two different materials in three layers. Figure 4 shows these layers, where the two surface layers are made of an isotropic material sandwiching a core layer of orthotropic material. The thicknesses of each layer of the four sheets (UD, LD, CPs and SPs) are all design variables, resulting in 8 design variables for this structural design problem. 
Component Arrangement Optimization Problem
A Micro-LabSat spins around its z-axis. To maintain a stable spin, the moment-of-inertia ratio and the direction of the principal axis of rotation are important criteria, which are optimized in this subproblem. These two criteria are affected by the arrangement of each of the twenty different components installed on the lower side of the UD, the upper side of the LD and both sides of the CPs. Only the nine largest components mounted on the three CPs are relevant for this problem, as the other eleven components mounted on the UD and LD cannot be moved due to observation requirements and temperature constraints. Therefore, the positions of these nine components are handled as design variables for the component arrangement optimization problem as shown in Figure 5 . (6) where
) are the moments of inertia (i = j), and the moments of product inertia ( j i ≠ ) of the satellite. The angle φ between the principal axis and the z-axis should be less than max φ : this is considered a constraint in the optimization problem.
The objective functions of this subproblem are dependent on the moment-of-inertia ratios S 1 and S 2 , which are shown in Equation (7) . When S 1 and S 2 have large values, a satellite can stably spin around its z-axis. In most designs, S 1 and S 2 are simultaneously maximized, therefore the optimization problem can be formulated as a multiobjective optimization problem where S 1 and S 2 are to be maximized.
However, optimization of the component arrangement is an extremely complex problem whose solution has numerous local optima, and several heuristics-based optimization approaches have been proposed, such as simulated annealing techniques [56] methods and genetic algorithms [57, 58] . The particular difficulty of our problem is the fact that the algorithm must handle the 3-D positioning of elements as shown in Figure 5 .
Therefore, a two-phase optimization procedure that uses genetic algorithms and SQP to solve this problem is developed in [54] . First, approximate locations of each component (namely which panel is used), the spatial relationships between the components (above or below, to the left or right), and the component orientation (vertical or horizontal), are decided using a genetic algorithm. This is facilitated by the fact that all of these design variables are discrete variables. The details of the genetic algorithm can be found in [54] and are represented in First, to maintain a reasonable weight distribution, the three heaviest components (ACE, PCE, and CCE) are allocated to three different panels (Figure 6(a) ). Then, the two largest remaining components (MTQ and MOBC) are allocated randomly each on one of the three free panels (Figure 6(b) ). Finally, the residual four small components are each allocated to one of the eight remaining spaces on the panels (Figure 6(c) ).
Results
The subsystems in this problem are highly coupled and the component layout subproblem is multiobjective. Figure 7 shows the influence of the design variables of each subsystem (on the bottom) on the objectives and constraints (on top). The sheet thicknesses, for example, not only influence the weight and natural frequency, but also the moment-of-inertia ratios. Similarly, the components' arrangement has a direct influence on the natural frequency.
In reality, only one of the two subsystems is truly multiobjective: the component arrangement subsystem, which has S 1 and S 2 for objectives. Indeed, in the structural subproblem, the natural frequency is a constraint, which is added to the objective function as a penalty term. The structural subproblem is therefore treated as a single-objective optimization problem, demonstrating the application of the approach to both types of problems.
Figure 7. Subproblem coupling
The starting point of the optimization problem is taken as the baseline design, whose objective function values are shown in Table 2 . The design variable values are used as initial guesses for the proposed method, and the objective function values are used to measure the performance of each method.
To establish a baseline noncooperative solution, an optimization is carried out using a standard point-to-point iterative technique. With a constant set of weights (w 1 = w 2 = 0.5) for the component arrangement subproblem, a point-based optimization leads to the non-cooperative solution shown in Table 2 . This corresponds to the equivalent of a Nash equilibrium for this set of weights (as discussed earlier, the notion of Nash equilibrium does not hold for multiobjective subsystems, as a new set of weights would change the equilibrium). Next, the set-based approach is applied to the same problem. The starting point is still the baseline design, and at each iteration, five points are chosen to be communicated to the other subsystem. The number of five points is certainly arbitrary and needs to be studied further. However, our experience with the case study gave us confidence that five points could represent the preferred region of the optimal frontier well without putting too much of a computation burden on the system analysis. The points were chosen from across the Pareto set, as we wanted to encourage exploration of new designs. A different strategy to choose the points might have been chosen later in the decentralized optimization process, but this particular problem converged quickly, making it impractical to test a different strategy.
Objective functions
For the structural subproblem, only one solution was communicated to the other design team since it was single objective. Table 2 shows the results of this method in terms of objective function values.
In order to graphically compare the results, we plot the three different solutions in a 2D-space representing the objectives of the component layout subproblem, S 1 and S 2 (these two objectives are to be maximized). Since the overall problem is three-dimensional (three objectives: W, S 1 , and S 2 ), the value of the third objective (weight W) for each solution is also shown in Figure 8 . The baseline weight value (11.3 kg) represents the initial guess for the first iteration by the component layout subproblem. The resulting Pareto set of the component arrangement subproblem, given this initial guess is included for illustration purposes. Note that the weight value improves significantly in the proposed method, but at the expense of the moments of inertia (most notably, S 1 ). This illustrates the compromise made between the subsystems through the coupled solution process.
It is also noted that a significant improvement has been made from the noncooperative solution using point-based optimization. The solution of the proposed method clearly dominates the non-cooperative solution as the values of all three objectives improved. Communicating a larger number of points can indeed broaden the designers' views and make possible the convergence towards better designs.
CONCLUSION
This paper reviews existing methods for solving decentralized design problems. The main contribution of this paper is to show the shortcomings of these techniques on a large group of decentralized problems, namely those involving multiobjective subproblems. Several possible approaches are studied, resulting in a recommendation of a set-based technique to study the dynamics and final results of these decentralized optimization problems. A case study of a satellite design shows the applicability of the method, as well as the improvements achieved.
This paper hopefully exposes a new set of problems that have not been directly studied with respect to convergence and rationality issues. This paper is a first step towards gaining formalism in solving decentralized design problems with multiobjective subproblems, similar to the formalism offered in [17, 30, 39] for decentralized design problems with single objective subproblems. The future work includes a sensitivity analysis of the parameters of the proposed method (e.g., number of points chosen, method of choosing points), and the introduction of new techniques to solve these problems.
